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Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                              
No.  05-3258
                              




                              
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Criminal Action No. 04-cr-00053-1E)
District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.
                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 10, 2007
Before: RENDELL and AMBRO, Circuit Judges,
SHAPIRO,* District Judge
(Opinion filed July 30, 2007)
                              
OPINION
                              
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
2Jontee Damon Russell appeals his criminal sentence imposed following a guilty plea.
He contends that the sentencing judge erred in failing to state in open court the reasons for
the imposition of his sentence, as 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) requires.  Because we conclude that
Russell knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal, we affirm that sentence.
I.  Facts and Procedural History
As we write for the parties, only a brief summary of the pertinent facts is necessary.
In November 2004, Russell and his co-defendant, Lisa Marie Dacus, were charged in an
indictment with knowingly and unlawfully possessing with the intent to distribute and
distributing five grams or more of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(B)(iii).  Three months later, Russell pled guilty to one count of the above charges.
At the hearing to enter his guilty plea, Russell swore under oath that he understood the terms
of his plea agreement. 
That agreement contained a provision in which the Government would request a
reduction in Russell’s sentence if he substantially assisted law enforcement agencies in
investigating drug offenses.  Dacus also agreed to provide substantial assistance to law
enforcement officials if the Government would request a downward departure in Russell’s
sentence.  Importantly, in his plea agreement Russell also waived his right to appeal, subject
to two exceptions: 1) if the Government appeals, or 2) if the sentence exceeds the applicable
statutory limits or unreasonably exceeds the range determined by the Court under the federal
Sentencing Guidelines.
In chambers before Russell’s sentencing on June 22, 2005, the Judge heard the
3Government’s § 5K1.1 motion for a downward departure based on substantial assistance.
A Special Agent for the FBI testified that Dacus had substantially assisted it but that Russell
had proved to be uncooperative.  The proceedings then moved to open court, where the Judge
sentenced Russell to 60 months in prison.  This sentence was a downward departure from the
70 to 87 month advisory Guidelines range contained in the presentence report, which neither
party challenged.  Although explaining that he had considered the Government’s § 5K1.1
motion, the Judge never explicitly stated the reasons for the imposition of Russell’s sentence.
Though Russell did not make a contemporaneous objection to this omission, he claims this
was plain error under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). 
II.  Discussion
In United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 203 (3d Cir. 2007), we concluded that our
Court retained appellate jurisdiction over the appeal of a defendant who had signed an
appellate waiver.  However, we would not review the merits of an appeal if we concluded
that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived that appeal, unless the result would
work a miscarriage of justice.  Id.  Therefore, we must ascertain whether Russell knew and
intended without coercion to waive his right to appeal and, if so, whether that was a
miscarriage of justice.
To make this determination, “the role of the sentencing judge is critical.”  United
States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001).  The evidence on record from the Rule
11 colloquy shows that Russell voluntarily signed the appellate waiver and knew its contents.
After ascertaining that he was competent to plead, the Judge had the significant terms of the
4plea agreement, including the appellate waiver, read by counsel for the Government.  App.
at 21, 29-30.  The Judge then explicitly asked Russell whether this reading of the plea
agreement was consistent with his understanding of its terms.  App. at 30.  He responded yes.
App. at 31.  Additionally, in response to the questions of the Judge, Russell swore under oath
that he was not forced to enter into the plea agreement and that he had discussed the matter
with his attorney.  App. at 28, 34.
On appeal, Russell does not contend that he was either forced to sign the waiver or
that he did not understand it.  In this context, there is no question that Russell knowingly and
voluntarily agreed to the appellate waiver.
Russell does not allege that the waiver resulted in a miscarriage of justice, and we
discern none in any event.  He received a sentence that was ten months less than the
minimum 70-month sentence of the advisory Guidelines range.  He appears to have received
this generous sentence, despite being uncooperative with law enforcement officials, based
solely on the substantial assistance provided by Dacus.
Lastly, neither of the exceptions to the appellate waiver contained in Russell’s plea
agreement apply.  This is not an appeal brought by the Government, and Russell’s 60-month
sentence neither exceeded the 40-year statutory maximum nor the 87-month maximum of the
Guidelines range.  
Because Russell knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal, we affirm his
sentence.       
